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Abstract 
This paper presents the first field experiment regarding ethnic discrimination in the market place of small business 
transfers. We let two fictitious prospective buyers, one with a typical Swedish name and one with a typical 
Arab/Muslim name, respond to advertisements of small business transfers on the Internet in Sweden. We then 
recorded the number contacts achieved by each fictitious buyer with sellers. We found that sellers discriminated 
against the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name in the sense that the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name obtained fewer 
contacts with sellers than did the buyer with a Swedish name.
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     1. Introduction 
 
Civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination against ethnic minorities exist for many domains 
and in most western societies. Research concerning ethnic discrimination has, however, been 
mainly focused on the labor and housing market where discrimination has been perceived to 
be particularly acute and harmful. Ethnic discrimination in much broader range of markets has 
been left uncovered in the literature of discrimination. Employment and housing may be the 
two most important markets in which people participate, but ethnic minorities may also be 
susceptible to discrimination in other significant markets. This paper examines whether the 
process of buying and taking over a small business disadvantages ethnic minorities. 
          It is a well known fact that ethnic minorities often suffer from higher unemployment 
rates than the native population and have a hard time entering the labor market. One important 
way out of unemployment for these exposed groups of minorities has been to start up their 
own business or take over an existing business and become self-employed. This is reflected 
by the fact that many OECD countries have experienced an increase in immigrant self-
employment rates during recent years. As a result, ethnic minorities are over-represented in 
self-employment in several countries today.
1  
          Research regarding immigrant self-employment has often focused on its determinants, 
and possible explanations to why immigrants should prefer self-employment to wage-
employment have been put forward in the literature. Furthermore, research has also shown 
that self-employed immigrants in many countries have lower earnings than self-employed 
natives. The low earnings among self-employed immigrants are often explained by the 
existence of consumer discrimination (Borjas and Bronars, 1989). 
          Research regarding immigrant self-employment has, however, neglected the fact that 
people can become self-employed either by starting a brand new business or by buying an 
already existing business. There are several reasons for why buying an already existing 
business may be a more favorable way to become self-employed compared to starting a brand 
new business. For instance, buying an already existing business gives the possibility to take 
over the existing business customer potential. Further, if it is a profitable business, the new 
owner gets an income stream right away. Also, banks would probably finance buying an 
existing business, but are more cautious to finance starting a new business. Thus, among 
individuals who decide to become self-employed, there are good reasons to believe that 
individuals who are buying an already existing business have an advantage compared to those 
who are starting a brand new business. 
          We then ask the following question: Do ethnic minorities have the same opportunities 
to buy an existing business in the market place of small business transfers? To address this 
question we study ethnic discrimination in the market place of small business transfers in 
Sweden with the help of a field experiment on the Internet. We conducted our field 
experiment by letting two fictitious prospective buyers, one with a typical Swedish name and 
one with a typical Arab/Muslim name, respond to advertisements of small business transfers 
                                                            
1 For studies from the United States, see Borjas (1986), Yuengert (1995), and Fairlie and Meyer (1996). For 
studies from European countries, see Clark and Drinkwater (2000), Constant and Zimmermann (2006), and 
Hammarstedt (2001, 2006). For studies from Asia and Australia, see Fernandez and Kim (1998) and Le (2000).   on the Internet in Sweden.  The outcome variable in our experiment was the number contacts 
that each fictitious buyer achieved with business sellers. We found that sellers discriminated 
against buyers with an Arab/Muslim name in the sense that the buyer with an Arab/Muslim 
name obtained fewer contacts with sellers than did the buyer with a Swedish name.     
          Sweden happens to be a suitable testing ground for conducting a field experiment like 
this since Sweden has a relatively sizable immigrant population. About 12 percent of 
Sweden’s population is made up of immigrants. There are different reasons for choosing an 
Arabic/Muslim and a Swedish name when conducting the experiment. First, a relatively large 
part of the immigrant population in Sweden is made up of immigrants from the Middle East. 
About 20 percent of the immigrant population is originating from countries in the Middle East 
or Northern Africa.  Second, immigrants from Arabic/Muslim countries in Sweden, just as in 
many other OECD countries, suffer from high rates of unemployment and often have a hard 
time entering the labor market. Third, immigrants from countries in the Middle East are over-
represented in self-employment compared to natives as well as compared to other immigrant 
groups in Sweden today. But it is well known that especially self-employed immigrants from 
the Middle East often have low earnings and that their businesses have lower survival rates 
than businesses established by natives (Andersson-Joona, forthcoming). Therefore, if we can 
document ethnic discrimination in the market place for small business transfers we have 
identified a barrier for successful ethnic self-employment and one explanation for the low 
earnings and low survival rates often observed among self-employed Middle Eastern 
immigrants.  
          It is relevant to ask why there is reason to expect differential treatment of people on 
account of their ethnicity in the market place of small business transfers. For incumbent 
owners, the business to be transferred is often the achievement of their life. They are therefore 
likely to attach emotional value to the business. Some researchers have stressed that the 
inability of a seller to “let go” of the business is a significant obstacle to effective business 
transfers.
2 It is therefore reasonable to believe that incumbent owners are careful when 
choosing a successor for their business. Incumbent owners may therefore discriminate buyers 
from an ethic group if they possess prejudiced attitudes toward that group of people. They 
will then discriminate those buyers to avoid dealing with them and handing over the business 
to them. Another reason for incumbent owners to discriminate is because of the prejudiced 
attitudes of the group of customers that supplies most of their business. These two hypotheses 
about the causes of discrimination by sellers are derived from the preference-based theory of 
discrimination (Becker, 1957).  
          Another  hypothesis  for  differential treatment by sellers can be derived from the 
statistical theory of discrimination (Phelps, 1972). In this case discrimination may exist if 
incumbent owners treat potential buyers from different groups differently because they 
believe that easily observable attributes, such as ethnicity, are correlated with some 
unobservable characteristics that are known to differ among groups. For example, an 
incumbent owner may believe that certain ethnic minority groups are less successful in 
running businesses or have less capacity to obtain finance for a business transfer and therefore 
                                                            
2 See, for example, Barach and Gantisky (1995) and Sharma et al. (2001). disregard them as potential buyers. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The 
methodology of the experiment is discussed in section 2, results are presented in section 3, 




To test whether there is disparate treatment by sellers on the basis of ethnicity in the market 
place of small business transfers, pairs of fictitious prospective buyers, one with a typical 
Arab/Muslim male name and one with a typical Swedish male name, used similar approaches 
to establish a contact with business sellers who had advertized their businesses on the Internet. 
Hence, our test measured differences in contact rates between the buyer with an Arab/Muslim 
name and the buyer with a Swedish name. Using the Internet gave us the advantage of being 
able to use written response letters rather than personal approaches, such as, telephone calls, 
thereby avoiding the potential problems that may arise from personal appearances (Heckman, 
1998). Experiments with written correspondence have previously been used to test for 
discrimination in the labor and housing markets.
3  
          The experiment was carried out in September and October, 2008. During this period we 
responded to all adverts with small businesses for sale on Blocket.se. This is one of the largest 
buy-and-sell sites in Sweden where the market place for business transfers is an active 
segment. Business owners can announce their businesses for a negligible advertisement cost 
and there is no charge for interested buyers to respond to an ad. If a buyer is interested in a 
particular item, he or she can send a message to the seller through an email form. The only 
information that is required to fill is his or her name, email address, and a short message of 
interest. Thus, the purpose of this website is to initiate a first contact between sellers and 
prospective buyers.  
           Without any restrictions regarding location and price, we responded, as a buyer with an 
Arab/Muslim name and as a buyer with a Swedish name, to all advertized businesses during 
the period. We recorded the time, date, heading of the ad, city, the gender of the seller, 
whether the seller had a foreign-sounding name, and the selling price. As outcome variables 
we recorded whether sellers emailed back or not. If they emailed back, we the also recorded 
whether the sellers were positive, in the sense that they invited to and welcomed further 
contacts and asked for more information about the buyer.  
          Before we could run the experiment, we needed to create identities for two fictitious 
buyers, one with an Arab/Muslim name and one with a Swedish name. There was no need for 
telephone numbers and postal addresses since all correspondence was accomplished through 
email. The only information required when answering an ad was a person’s name and an 
email address to which a seller could reply. For the Arab/Muslim buyer we used the name 
Mohammed Rashid which is a typical Arab/Muslim male name, and for the Swedish buyer we 
used the name Fredrik Svensson which is a typical Swedish male name. Next we registered 
email addresses for the sellers.
4    
                                                            
3 See, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for an experiment in the labor market and Ahmed and 
Hammarstedt (2008) for an experiment in the housing market. 
4 Email accounts were created under the addresses mohammed.rashid@spray.se and fredrik.svensson@yahoo.se.           Another important part in the experimental design was to generate response letters. In 
order to let both buyers respond to all ads and to minimize the risk of being exposed we 
generated two different formulations of a response letter with similar content. We put together 
concise letters that only stated a notification of interest. For example, one of the letters was 
formulated as following: 
 
Hi, my name is Mohammed Rashid (Fredrik Svensson). I saw your advertisement 
of a business transfer. It sounds interesting and I would like to establish further 
contact with you. Look forward to your response. Mohammed Rashid (Fredrik 
Svensson) 
 
The only thing that differed between buyers was whether they had an Arab/Muslim or 
Swedish name.
5 Obviously, the two buyers never responded to the same ad with letters that 
were identical in the wording. Each of the two formulations was used half of the time for each 
buyer. We also controlled for the order of the responses from our two buyers. Thus, half of 
the time the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name was first to respond to an ad and half of the 
time the buyer with a Swedish name was first to put in a respond.  
          Before we turn to the results of the experiment we want discuss some of its limitations 
that the reader should keep in mind when interpreting the results. First, our outcome variable 
is quite simple. Ultimately, one wants to know whether a prospective buyer gets to buy a 
business and about the price paid conditional on that the business is transferred. We simply 
measure a contact rate, i.e., whether or not sellers reply to our fictitious buyers’ responses. 
One could expect that reduced contact rates could render into reduced business transfer offers. 
However, we are unable to interpret our results into differences in the number of businesses 
transferred or gaps in prices paid for businesses.  
          Second, we did not directly indicate ethnicity, but signaled it through the names that we 
had created for our fictitious buyers: this could cause problems. Some sellers who we 
responded to may not have noticed the names or recognized the ethnic content of the names of 
the fictitious buyers. Third, it was difficult for us to record the full identity and characteristics 
of the business sellers. Even if information had been available, it would not have been fully 
reliable since the anonymity granted by the Internet means that buyers advertising businesses 
could have created artificial identities. A related problem is that sellers might have discussed 
their decisions with others so that, in some cases, the decision-maker may not have been an 
individual, but more than one person.  
          Finally, the Internet is only one of several channels that could be used for a small 
business transfers. Other common channels are newspaper ads and social networks that we 
clearly did not include in our study. This exclusion could have qualitatively influenced our 
results, if the reality is that Arabic/Muslim buyers typically use other search channels than 
Swedish buyers. Also, the results might have been affected if business sellers who advertise 
on the Internet discriminate either more or less than business sellers who use other channels 
for advertising business transfers.  
 
                                                            
5 The other response letter is available from the authors upon request. Table 1 
Percent (fraction) of responses that led to a contact and percent (fraction) of responses that 
led to a positive contact 








p < 0.001 






p < 0.001 
Note: The p–values are reported for a two-sided paired sample t–test for differences in 
average contact and positive contact rates. 
 
 
3. Results  
 
Does discrimination exist in the market place of small business transfers? We devote the 
following section to this question. Both of our fictitious buyers responded to 546 ads. Table 1 
presents the average contact rates for the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name and for the buyer 
with a Swedish name, given in percentages. Included in the brackets beside each rate is the 
actual number of cases out of the total 546. The first row in Table 1 (Contact) presents the 
percentage of responses that resulted in a contact, regardless of whether it was a positive or a 
negative. The second row (Positive contact) gives the percentage of responses that resulted in 
a positive contact from the seller, that is, cases where the seller invited our buyers to further 
contact.   
          Table 1 shows that the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name had a 67 percent chance that 
their responses to sellers’ ads resulted in a contact. The corresponding percentage for the 
buyer with a Swedish name was about 76 percent. Similarly, 65 percent of the responses from 
the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name and 74 percent of the responses from the buyer with a 
Swedish name led to a positive contact (meaning that the sellers invited the buyers to provide 
more information and welcomed further contact). The paired differences test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no ethnic discrimination in the market of small business transfers at better than 
the 0.1 percent level.  
          In Table 1 we tabulated the distribution of contact rates at the buyer level. In Table 2, 
we computed the percentage of sellers that did not contact either of the buyers (given by the 
column None), the percentage of sellers that contacted both of the buyers (given by the 
column Both), the percentage of sellers that only contacted the buyer with an Arab/Muslim 
name (given by the column Only Arab/Muslim), and the percentage of sellers that only 
contacted the buyer with a Swedish name (given by the column Only Swedish). What is of 
interest in Table 2 is to observe if there is symmetry between the proportion of sellers that 
only contacted the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name and the proportion of sellers that only 
contacted the buyer with a Swedish name. If pa equals the probability that the sellers only 
contacted the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name, and ps equals the probability that the sellers 
only contacted the buyer with a Swedish name, then, the null hypothesis of symmetric 
treatment is ps/(ps + pa) = ½. Table 2 
Distribution of contact rates in percent (number of cases within parentheses) 














p < 0.001 








p = 0.180 
Note: The p–values are reported for a two-sided McNemar test of symmetry between the 
proportion of sellers that favored the Arab/Muslim buyer and the proportion that favored the 
Swedish buyer. We also conducted the binomial sign test, resulting in the same p–values. 
 
 
          As Table 2 indicates, we reject the hypothesis of symmetry for the outcome variable 
Contact but not for Positive contacts. This suggests that discrimination against the buyer with 
an Arab/Muslim name occurred in the first stage, meaning that those sellers who 
discriminated against the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name did so by simply ignoring his 
responses. Sellers who chose to contact both buyers did not discriminate against the buyer 
with an Arab/Muslim name in respect to positive contacts. 
          Finally we end this section by calculating the net incidence of discrimination for the 
outcome variable Contact. This can be done in two ways depending on whether the cases 
where none of the buyers were invited (given by the column None in Table 2) are treated as 
observations of equal treatment or as non-observations. If we treat these cases as observations 
of equal treatment net incidence of discrimination is equal to the percentage of all sellers that 
only contacted the buyer with a Swedish name (13.7) minus the percentage of all sellers that 
only contacted the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name (5.7). Hence, net incidence of 
discrimination in this case becomes 8 percent. Yet, if we treat the cases where none of the 
buyers were invited as non-observations we end up with 546 – 103 = 443 total usable cases. 
Net incidence of discrimination is then found by subtracting the number of cases where only 
the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name was contacted (31) from the number of cases where 
only the buyer with a Swedish name was contacted (75) and then dividing by the total usable 
cases (443). Net incidence of discrimination in this case becomes 10 percent. Consequently, it 
is reasonable to say that the net incidence of discrimination lies between 8 and 10 percent. 
The latter measure has, however, become conventional in the literature.




This paper has investigated whether the process of buying and taking over a small business 
places ethnic minorities at a disadvantage. A field experiment on the Internet in Sweden was 
conducted in which we had two fictitious prospective buyers, one with a typical Swedish 
name and one with a typical Arab/Muslim name, respond to advertisements of small business 
                                                            
6 See Riach and Rich (2002) for a further discussion about the measurement of net incidence of discrimination. transfers. Our outcome variables were the number of contacts and positive contacts that each 
fictitious buyer achieved with sellers. We found that the buyer with an Arab/Muslim name 
obtained fewer contacts with sellers than did the buyer with a Swedish name in the 
experiment. Thus, ethnic discrimination exists in the marketplace of small business transfers.  
                    The result that ethnic minorities may face difficulties and discrimination in the 
marketplace of small business transfers leads to the conclusion that ethnic minorities have 
difficulties in succeeding in self-employment since we have good reasons to believe that self-
employed individuals who are buying an already existing business have an advantage 
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